Research aircraft have become increasingly dependent on advanced electronic control systems to accomplish program goals. These aircraft are integrating multiple disciplines to improve performance and satisfy research objectives. This integration is being accomplished through electronic control systems.
tools. However, recent advances inpersonal computers and newsoftware (S/W) tools have reestablished theuse ofthese structured system engineering methods. _ The systemdesignaspects of the systemdesign/ information toolexpand onthecurrent systems engineeringmethods by 1)automatically creating aknowledge base (KB)oftheprocesses, data flows, andexternals; and2)including functions to verifyconsistency in design requirements unique toflightcrucial control systems.
Theinformation aspects of thistooladdress theneed to provide design andimplementation information throughout aflight control system's (FCS's) lifecycle, and, specifically, tothetest engineers. Theverification andvalidation (Vand V)effortforthedigital FCSisofparticular concern tothe test engineer. Complete V andV isrequired toassure flight safety andrequires thedesign information toestablish, run, and analyze theV andV tests. Problems associated withV andV have caused major digital FCS developments toslip byasmuch as18months. 2Thesystem design/information tool needs to include the flight control design knowledge and its hardware (H/W) and S/W implementation.
Figure l shows a typical life cycle for an FCS and how the system design/information tool would support all phases. Shown is a typical life cycle for an FCS and how the life cycle phases relate to the system/information tool's capabilities. Some of the current tools which would share information with the system design/information tool are shown in the lower half of the figure.
The following review of research aircraft and the unique design errors that were found shows how system complexity can hide design errors from even the most experienced engineers. These errors reflect, in part, the difficulty of adequately communicating the system design details to the test engineers in the multiple disciplines. These disciplines include flight control law development, H/W design and test; S/W specification, coding and test; system integration and test; and flight test operations.
X-29 Description and Airdata Single-Point Failure
The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft is an experimental vehicle which integrates a number of advanced technologies. These technologies include a forward-swept wing, tailored composite wing structure, and full authority digital flight control. The aircraft is also highly unstable and is dependent on the triplex digital FCS for stability and handling qualities. 3
The FCS feedback gains are scheduled using air data. Air data errors can cause incorrect flight control gains and loss of the aircraft.
To avoid incorrect gains, the X-29A has three sources of air data. Redundancy management S/W takes the three air data values, detects any failures, and selects a value to be used in the control law calculations.
After flying over 200 flights, a serious design error in the redundancy management logic was found during verification of a new release of flight S/W being tested in groundbased simulation. The error was attributed to the multidisciplinary nature of the system and had been in the flight S/W since the 38th flight. A lack of detailed understanding about the interactions between the air data system, redundancy management S/W, and the flight control laws allowed for the design error to occur and is discussed below.
The fault detection level in the redundancy management S/W was set at a large value because of errors, such as position errors, possible between the probes at certain flight conditions (Fig. 2) . In the case of a probe failure, air data errors as large as the fault detection level were allowed to pass through to the control laws. At the lower and slower end of the flight envelope, a fail-to-zero of the nose probe would not be detected. The AFTI F-16 flight control system was a triplex, asynchronous digital system. The asynchronous architecture meant that input signals from sensors and controllers were read at different times into the three computers using a highspeed serial, digital data link (Fig. 3) . Concerns for S/W reliability were addressed with the inclusion of a triplex, analog-independent backup unit.
The following summarizes an in-flight anomaly which occurred on flight 44. 2 This anomaly was the result of the interaction of many design characteristics and a unique flight condition. The characteristics included asynchronous computer operation, forward integrators in the control laws, and output redundancy management S/W. These characteristics coupled with a unique flight condition and resulted in the divergence of the three computers' output commands to the control surfaces. The redundancy management S/W in each of the channels declared the other two channels as failed.
The pilots indication of this apparent simultaneous failure of all three computers was a dual fail flight control light in the cockpit. The end result of this in-flight anomaly was that the aircraft safely landed on what was effectively a singlestring flight control system, even though no actual H/W failure had occurred.
Like the X-29 example, the AFTI F-16 had a serious design error resulting from the lack of a detailed understanding of the interactions between the many different disciplinary areas. Inthiscase thedesign errorwasnotrecognized until after anin-flight anomaly wasexperienced.
HiMAT Design and Gear Deployment Anomaly
The HiMAT demonstrator was a remotely piloted research vehicle which incorporated such advances as composite structures, aeroelastic tailoring, reduced static stability, and digital flight control. 4 The aircraft was remotely piloted because the technologies represented too high a risk for a manned vehicle.
The HiMAT was flown remotely with the pilot in a ground-based cockpit and the control laws calculated in ground-based computers. Surface commands were telemetered to the aircraft as were aircraft sensor data which were telemetered to the ground (Fig. 4) Links from the system requirements to the S/W and H/W designs. The links will allow the system requirements to be verified against the proposed implementation. Verification could then be done in an automated fashion, prior to committing to the build phase. This rapid prototyping concept would increase the chance of finding serious design errors prior to flight test.
Currently, some system design tools have become commercially available, but they do not address the needs of flight-crucial systems and only create conventional databases called data dictionaries.
The actual H/W and S/W implementation information is not an integral part of these tools.
Description of the Knowledge-Based System

Design/Information Tool
The following section will review the work accomplished to date and show how it applies to the larger problem outlined above.
The methods for capturing system design knowledge, examples of what can be done using this knowledge, and an overview of the structure of the knowledgebased system (KBS) will be discussed.
In related work, a good approach to design knowledge capture for the space station can be found in Wechsler. The tool creates linked hierarchical trees of data flows, processes, and externals. Each node in the process tree represents a process and is provided with a process description and other unique attributes which are stored in slots. To support flight control system design, the tool stores and tracks requirements for failure probability and mission criticality.
In addition, external agencies and data flow objects are identiffed in the KB. All of this information is depicted graphically in data flow diagrams (DFDs). The concepts of a process, an external, and a data flow, as defined by structured analysis, are identified here as graphical objects and individually represented as frames. The properties of the process, external, data store, and data flow objects are stored in the slots of the individual frames associated with each of these objects. The name of the process, failure probability, and data flow inputs are all examples of slots. The nature of the slot values can draw from the full spectrum of the paradigms supported by the Knowledge Engineering Environment (KEErU). Namely, they may be simple values, pointers to other frames, inherited values, active values, rules, and so forth. This KR will allow the users to perform various expert analyses of the system design. It is intended that the pointers, which are stored as slot values, will provide access to the related H/W, S/W, and utilities implementation knowledge stored elsewhere.
A hierarchical representation scheme is used for each of the three types of objects (processes, externals, and data flows). Each of these three hierarchies forms an individual, linked KB. In each case, the hierarchy is used to allow properties to be inherited and to identify the natural linkage between individual objects. These individual KBs are linked with pointers.
In a typical application of the structured analysis methodology, the data flow diagrams are viewed as an end object.
In this KBS, the data flow diagrams are primarily viewed as a graphical front end for the KCS. Every data flow diagram image is mouse sensitive and possesses its own menu for entering and accessing knowledge. Now the test engineer can graphically see the relationships between systems, rather than trying to infer them from stacks of written text.
Hardware
Design Realm
The knowledge representation for the H/W design is based upon the hierarchical block diagrams typically used in this problem domain.
The nature of the representation is similar, although not identical, to the structured analysis methodology. The H/W objects are represented graphically as blocks, and these objects are decomposed in a hierarchical fashion until they have been described to an adequate degree of detail. 
Software
Design Realm
The structured analysis methodology is also used to describe the S/W design. The long-range plans include placing the KCS on a network with a workstation that has the flight code. This would give the KCS access to the flight code so that it would be possible to pull up listings of the flight code. relevant to the objects defined in the S/W design data flow diagrams.
Utilities Design Realm
The utilities consist of the electrical power, hydraulic power, and environmental control systems which form an infrastructure fortheFCS, andanyembedded avionics systemfor thatmatter.TheKR for this realm will utilize the structured analysis methodology to encode the design knowledge.
It will also utilize the block diagram representation described previously for the H/W design realm.
This representation will be used to encode the implementation knowledge.
Authoring and Browsing Mechanisms
The authoring mechanisms allow the user to create, delete, connect, and locate the user interface graphical images with mouse and menu commands.
These demon is used to verify that failure probability requirements are kept as the design is decomposed.
The browsing mechanisms allow the user to display the text description, hierarchical relationships, and properties for the objects which have been entered into the semantic network. This information is accessed through the graphical, menu-driven, and mouse-sensitive user interface. This interface supports a random access to the KB. The knowledge representation supports a browsing strategy similar to the way we, as humans, pursue problem solutions. In this case, the network structure tends to guide the user in exploring the KB.
A Decomposition of the Spin Recovery System
The HARV flight tests will include research flight work with an angle of attack greater than 55°. For safety of flight in this regime, a spin chute recovery system has been added to the F/A-18A research aircraft. The following describes a decomposition which has been performed on the spin chute recovery system using the KCS.
Figures 7 and 8 show the hierarchical decomposition of the primary system that will deploy a spin chute for a spin recovery. These figures depict two of the many H/W diagrams involved in the decomposition of the spin chute recovery system. Figure 7 includes a partial display of the hierarchy. Figure 8 indicates the use of dual abstractions.
The box/line graphics provide an abstraction which follows directly from the top level HAV diagram graphical user interface. These box/line abstractions are linked directly to the objects in the hierarchical H/W design KB. The bit map graphical depiction of the circuit diagram has been added to clarify the user interface at the component level.
The two abstractions are tied together with bit-mapped hot spots. Authoring mechanisms allow the user to link the box/line abstractions (and correspondingly their H/W and signal flow objects) to as many hot spots on the bit map abstraction as may be desired. Browsing mechanisms allow the user to mouse on a hot spot or a box/line abstraction.
Highlighting
indicates the correspondence between a selected hot spot and its box/line abstractions.
Similarly, highlighting indicates the correspondence between a selected H/W object (or signal flow object) and the relevant hot spots.
Further work in this area will be concentrating on the ability to take detailed H/W diagrams and perform failure modes and effects analysis of the systems they represent.
A Behavioral Model for the Nosewheel Steering System
The KBS includes dynamic behavioral models to aid the test engineer and also provides for rapid prototyping of the system. These models will be used to describe the system operation as a function of its operating modes. The models will permit the user to interactively enter mode commands and explore their impact on FCS operation. The NWS is a secondary control system within the FCS which is only operable on the ground.
It provides nosewheel angular deflection proportional to pedal force when engaged.
There are three modes of operation: off, low gain, and high gain. The desired mode is selected by the pilot, with switches located on the control stick grip, and is a function of several inputs, such as wing fold and weight on wheels. The NWS switch is used for NWS engagement and mode control, while the autopilot switch is used for NWS disengagement on the ground.
A dynamic interactive display (Fig.  9 ) is provided to control and display the control stick switch commands, the NWS system status, the NWS system block diagram, and the relevant F/A-18A aircraft status. The display window of the control stick switches includes a control stick and KEE TM active images for the NWS and autopilot switches.
This window, which is mouse sensitive, will accept switch commands inanidentical fashion tothose issued bythepilot by wayof theactual aircraft control stick.TheKEE TM active images, which depict the NWS switch and the autopilot switch, are mouse sensitive. It is possible to issue a momentarily depressed, held depressed, or released command with these images.
The display of the aircraft status is also mouse sensitive.
It is possible to explore the NWS logical operation as a function of aircraft power, touchdown status, wing fold status, and launch bar status by mousing the appropriate active image. As these parameters are changed, the appropriate operational mode is dynamically updated and displayed in the F/A-18A operation mode window. The NWS-related aircraft operational modes are: power off, wings folded, taxi, takeoff (T/O), launch, in flight, and landing.
A rule-based system implements the NWS mode logic.
These rules are activated by the control stick switch commands and by changes in the aircraft status variables. The NWS system response is displayed by highlighting the appropriate mode in the NWS control mode status window.
The NWS system response is also displayed by highlighting the control path in the NWS system block diagram window. It is possible to trace the rule execution in a KEE TM dynamic forward chaining execution window. The rule displays are mouse sensitive and permit the user to display a selected rule.
Knowledge-Based System Structure
The KBS is coded in Common Lisp, utilizes an expert system shell called the knowledge engineering environment, and is currently under development on a Symbolics machine (Fig. 10) . This rapid prototyping environment has been utilized for the development of a KCS, which is tailored to the needs of the FCS problem domain. The KCS can be ported to any platform which is supported by KEE TM. These platforms currently include the Symbolics and other major computing environments.
The KCS includes authoring mechanisms which enable the user to build a semantic network uniquely appropriate to a particular FCS. The KCS also includes browsing mechanisms which provide access to the semantic network knowledge. Rule-based models perform their reasoning on the objects defined in the semantic network.
The semantic network is composed of four realms of knowledge: the FCS system design realm, the FCS H/W design realm, the FCS S/W design realm, and the FCS utilities design realm (Fig. 11) . Each of these realms is implemented with linked hierarchical networks of objects. The KBS semantic network is formed by linking the hierarchical networks of the four realms. The objects are individually represented with a frame-based representation. Authoring mechanisms enable the user to define a semantic network of FCS objects and their properties.
The semantic network of FCS objects are defined in an environment which includes an inference engine. Reasoning functions are under development which will enable the user to view and analyze the objects defined. Three kinds of models are to be developed:
1. behavioral models 2. failure mode and effects models 3. fault tree analysis models
The behavioral models are to provide a dynamic presentation of how designated objects behave as a function of user commands, FCS state variables, and FCS modes. The failure mode models are to indicate the loss of functionality associated with component failures. The fault tree models are to provide a diagnostic capability for the loss of FCS functionality. This diagnostic capability will allow the user to identify the possible causes and to help isolate the actual cause of the loss of FCS functionality.
Concluding Remarks
This project has proven to be an ambitious one. The roughly three man-years of effort have yielded a prototype which promises to fulfill the objectives, stated earlier, for a useful flight-crucial segment of the high-angle-of-attack research vehicle flight control system.
So far, the promises of artificial intelligence have been fulfilled. It has been possible to develop a knowledge capture system that captures the flight control system knowledge in a form which is tailored to the problem domain and is accessible to the user in a friendly fashion. Furthermore, the modeling capability has proven the value of defining the flight control system objects in an environment with an inference engine.
The system and hardware design realms now have a working functionality. In the remaining one man-year of effort, it is projected that a working prototype, capturing knowledge in all fot_of the realms, will be implemented. in terms of computer resource requirements, the response time is generally adequate, and less than 10 megabytes on the hard disk have been required to date for the design knowledge.
Looking to the future, it is projected that this prototype provides an infrastructure upon which a full-scale, fully operational knowledge capture system will be built that in- 
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